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Abstract 
This paper investigates the information environment during and after a corporate break-up utiliz-
ing direct measures of information asymmetry developed in the market microstructure literature. 
The analysis is based on all corporate break-ups in the United States in the period 1995-2005. 
The results document that information asymmetry declines significantly as a result of a break-up. 
However, this reduction takes place not at the time of its announcement or its completion, but 
after it has been fully consummated. At the same time, not all investors are equally affected, but 
informed investors who generate private information by skilled analysis of public information 
come to play a more important role compared to traditional corporate insiders. This might explain 
why financial advisors promote break-ups among their corporate clients, as they are likely bene-
ficiaries. The positive stock-market reaction to break-up announcements is significantly related to 
reductions in insider-related information asymmetry, indicating that the advantage of skilled in-
formation analysts does not offset the overall improvement in the information environment due to 
a break-up. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
There is substantial evidence of a significant stock market reaction to the announcement and im-
plementation of corporate restructurings that break-up a firm into smaller entities.1 There are sev-
eral explanations for this stock-market reaction to break-ups.2 The focus of this paper is on an 
important strand of this literature that is anchored in the hypothesis that the stock market reaction 
is related to improvements in the information environment. Specifically, it suggests that corporate 
break-ups may enhance firm value by reducing the level of information asymmetry, since value-
relevant information about the different divisions of the firm become widely and transparently 
available when some of these divisions report individually to the financial markets. Such an in-
formation environment-based explanation is particularly important in view of the recent theoreti-
cal and empirical literature discussing the price-relevance of the exposure of investors to informa-
tion asymmetry (see, e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, 2002; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, 
2004). 
Apart from theoretical papers that show that the information environment should improve 
after the spin-off (e.g., see Habib et al. (1997)), there are few empirical studies that examine the 
information environment in the context of corporate restructurings (Gilson et al., 2001; Huson 
and MacKinnon, 2003; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), analyzing stock-level residual 
returns or financial analysts’ market participation and forecasting precision in order to assess the 
effect of a break-up on this group of investors. It is unclear, however, whether and if so how the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003), Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993), Daley, Mehrotra, 
and Sivakumar (1997), and Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002). 
2 Explanations of the stock-market reaction to break-ups include the following: expected and realised improvements 
in efficiency (Çolak and Whited, 2007; Gertner et al., 2002; Habib, Johnsen, and Naik, 1997; Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova, 2005), improvements in the quality of analysts’ forecasts (Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu, 2001; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), asset re-distribution between debt holders and equity holders (Maxwell and 
Rao, 2003; Parrino, 1997), issues around corporate control (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2001), expected and realized 
take-over premia (Cusatis et al., 1993), liquidity trading (Abarbanell et al., 2003; Brown and Brooke, 1993), and 
transaction costs (Vijh, 1994). 
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information environment faced by the public investor is affected by break-ups. The main contri-
bution of this paper is to utilize a direct measure of information asymmetry developed in the 
market microstructure literature to comprehensively investigate how the information environment 
changes during and after a corporate break-up. Specifically, it uses intra-day transactions data of 
the NYSE and Nasdaq in order to analyze spin-offs, carve-outs, and other forms of corporate re-
structuring that break one combined firm into legally separated entities over the eleven-year pe-
riod between January 1995 and December 2005. Using tick-by-tick data, the level of information 
asymmetry prior, during, and after the break-up is calculated and related to factors that poten-
tially influence the information environment and break-up announcement returns. 
The paper is related to the theoretical work by Habib et al. (1997) and the empirical stud-
ies by Gilson et al. (2001) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). Habib et al. (1997) show 
that – assuming the existence of heterogeneously informed investors – uninformed investors 
value spin-offs as these improve the strength of the information in the price signal of security 
prices. The findings of the two empirical studies suggest that financial analysts have industry ex-
pertise and thus are able to issue more precise forecast for stocks in industries they know best. 
Moreover, analysts appear to have more precise and useful information after the break-up. Never-
theless, these studies do not directly measure information asymmetry faced by all investors in 
financial markets and, therefore, only indirectly address the question whether all investors ulti-
mately benefit from a break-up. Furthermore, little is known about the change of information 
asymmetry during the break-up process as well as whether and how investors value reductions in 
the information environment related to corporate break-ups. 
Different types of investors may face different levels of information asymmetry. Huson 
and MacKinnon (2003), another study this paper is related to this paper, look at the post break-up 
changes in residual returns, effective spreads, and price impacts of trades. Unlike most other stud-
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ies, they find that information asymmetry increases after the break-up. This result, which at first 
seems to contradict most of the previous and our findings, can be reconciled with evidence re-
ported in this paper that different types of informed investors are affected differently by the 
break-up. The best informed but likely smallest group of investors is the group of corporate in-
siders. These investors face little firm-specific information asymmetry, as they should have all 
pieces of value-relevant firm-specific information. Investors who are particularly skilled in ana-
lyzing public information in the spirit of Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) can be considered 
second best informed. Finally, the typically largest group of investors is the uninformed public, 
who face information asymmetry stemming from both types of informed investors, the corporate 
insider and the skilled information analyst. Although Huson and MacKinnon (2003) do not make 
this distinction, it seems likely that their results reflect activity of the latter type of informed 
trader. The market microstructure perspective of this paper allows considering, for the first time, 
the information environment of the uninformed investor separately from the information envi-
ronment of analysts and corporate insiders. Trades by informed investors that exploit private in-
formation generated from public data should lead to a co-movement between stock-level infor-
mation asymmetry and variables that capture the environment of an investor (see, e.g., Bardong, 
Bartram, and Yadav, 2007).3 By considering the potential sources of private information sepa-
rately, this paper addresses the question whether uninformed investors benefit from a corporate 
break-up. It also allows examining the importance of skilled information analysts vis-à-vis unin-
formed investors. 
                                                 
3 Empirical evidence suggests the existence of private information about the mapping of the publicly known informa-
tion into returns since even in liquid and well-research markets with no insider information, such as the Treasury 
bond market, the price adjustment to new public information is stretched out over time (see, e.g., Boni and Leach, 
2002; Fleming and Remolona, 1999). Other papers model theoretically how private information on systematic return 
factors affect prices (see, e.g., Admati, 1984; Hughes, Liu, and Liu, 2005). 
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The empirical approach of this paper allows differentiating between the predicable and 
unpredictable component of information asymmetry. The predicable component of information 
asymmetry, which can be attributed to the skilled analysis of public information, differs from the 
private firm-specific informational advantage, which is traditionally associated with corporate 
insiders, and therefore helps differentiating between these two types of informed investors. 
The market microstructure perspective employed here makes it possible to analyze data 
on a higher frequency compared to previous studies.4 First, using high frequency measures of in-
formation asymmetry, one can avoid attributing to the break-up the effect other events have on 
the information environment that happen to occur in the same month or year of the break-up, 
such as changes in the investor communication policy or developments in the regulatory envi-
ronment. Second, high frequency data allows looking at changes in information asymmetry at 
precise dates over the course of the break-up process. This not only provides more detail to the 
analysis but is also of practical use, as the results show whether or not uninformed investors 
should avoid trading around the information events of the break-up process. 
In this paper, alternative explanations for the stock-market reaction to break-ups that have 
been pursued in the literature are not directly addressed, although the results are checked for ro-
bustness to some of these alternative causes of break-ups. While several of these additional fac-
tors are surely important for explaining the stock market reaction to break-up announcements, the 
perspective of this paper based on the information environment may offer valuable additions to 
the extant literature as different explanations can be conflicting and difficult to reconcile with 
                                                 
4 Huson and MacKinnon (2003) also use intra-day data in their analysis. 
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each other.5 Linking information asymmetry to the different stages of the break-up process has 
not been undertaken before and is also one of the contributions of this paper. 
Information asymmetry is estimated directly by the ex post adverse selection losses of li-
quidity suppliers to traders demanding liquidity, since these losses should arguably be zero, on 
average, in the absence of information asymmetry. In addition, for better comparability with ex-
isting results, the effect of break-ups on the quality of earnings forecasts and the PIN measure is 
also investigates. The results show that, consistent with Habib et al. (1997), the level of informa-
tion asymmetry directly relevant to the uninformed public investor, and thus the uncertainty 
about asset values, is significantly lower after the break-up. Information asymmetry declines only 
slightly in the period between the break-up announcement and the completion of the break-up, 
but declines significantly after the break-up is fully consummated. Moreover, the composition of 
informed trades changes after the break-up. The results further suggest that informed traders who 
are particularly skilled in analyzing public information become more important relative to corpo-
rate insiders after the restructuring.6 
                                                 
5 For example, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2005) find a positive reaction in the stock market and the bond markets, 
which contradicts the asset redistribution hypothesis by Maxwell and Rao (2003) and Parrino (1997). Alternatively, 
Gertner et al. (2002) associate the stock market reaction to expected reductions in inefficiencies, which Çolak and 
Whited (2007) cannot confirm. Çolak and Whited (2007) find that spin-off activity is related to industry-level IPO 
activity. IPO activity itself has been found to be related to investor irrationality (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991), 
implying that spin-off activity may not be entirely driven by expectations of rational investors. This is contrary to the 
findings of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), who show an improvement in the information environment, 
suggesting that investors rationally use all available information to determine firm value. Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2001) and Cusatis et al. (1993) find only weak indications that investors have more information and conclude that 
the transfer of control is the main driver of the stock-market reaction to break-up announcements. Effects of break-up 
on investors’ information sets are even explicitly ruled out by Abarbanell et al. (2003), Brown and Brooke (1993), 
and Vijh (1994), who attribute the stock market reaction to break-up announcements and the break-up consummation 
to preference-motivated trades and portfolio rebalancing. 
6 This can be rationalized by the improvement in the information environment. According to Harris (2003, p. 584) 
“insider information is material information about the value of a security that is not available to public traders”. As 
more information is available to everyone, corporate insiders who happen to have firm-specific information lose 
some of their advantage. At the same time, investors who are particularly skilled in analyzing new information be-
come more advantaged. These traders are characterized by Harris (2003, p. 177) as “informed traders that typically 
form their opinions from insightful analyses of publicly available information or from simple analyses of information 
that is not widely known”. 
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The finding that skilled information analysts particularly benefit from break-up may ex-
plain why financial intermediaries commit more and better resources to analyzing a firm after the 
break-up. These institutions are likely to benefit directly from break-ups through informed trad-
ing either by these institutions themselves. In addition, as Habib et al. (1997) show, demand for 
the shares of the break-up firms by uninformed increases after the break-up due to the informa-
tion they generate from the newly available price information. Therefore, these institutions also 
benefit from the additional trading by their customers. The finding that skilled information ana-
lysts benefit from and promote break-ups (Harris, 2003, p. 177) reconciles the previous finding of 
industry-level correlation of break-up activity with the argument of transfer of ownership as a 
driver of break-up activity. It is likely that industry-waves of break-up activity (Çolak and 
Whited, 2007) as well as in take-over activity after the break-up (Cusatis et al., 1993) reflect the 
improved information set of financial institutions in these transactions. Finally, the stock-market 
reaction to the break-up announcement appears to be significantly related to break up-related de-
clines in information asymmetry, particularly to declines in corporate insider-related informed 
trading activity. 
To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it uses, for the 
first time, a direct measure of information asymmetry developed in the market microstructure lit-
erature to provide insights into the changes of the information environment during and after cor-
porate break-ups. It thereby specifically addresses the question whether uninformed public inves-
tors benefit from lower levels of information asymmetry after the break-up and whether skilled 
information analysts become more advantaged. Second, it tracks information asymmetry over the 
various stages of the break-up process, which may serve institutional investors, liquidity provid-
ers and retail investors to optimize the timing of their trades. Finally, it investigates the relation-
ship between information asymmetry and stock returns, an issue that has only recently received 
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attention in academic research (see, e.g., Easley et al., 2002; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Hughes et 
al., 2005). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the research ques-
tions from extant literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the results of the 
empirical analysis, and Section 5 provides a summary and the conclusion of the paper. 
2 Research Questions 
The research questions of this paper can be classified into four main groups. First, it is examined 
whether corporate break-up activity is associated with specific firm-level characteristics. Second, 
it is investigated whether and how information asymmetry changes during and after the break-up. 
Third, this paper intends to determine whether the composition of trades that exploit the existing 
information asymmetry is affected by the break-up and how the break-up announcement returns 
are related to the post break-up information environment. 
In what follows, the following terminology is used. The parent is the original entity and 
the sub is the entity that is separated from the parent by means of the break-up. In addition, the 
break-up period is subdivided into (1) the announcement date, where the break-up is first pub-
licly announced, (2) the completion date, where the final terms of the restructuring are made pub-
lic, and (3) the distribution date, which is the day when the break-up is consummated.7 
2.1 Main Characteristics of Break-up Firms 
Research on break-ups typically finds that focus-increasing break-ups are particularly beneficial 
to investors (see, e.g., Habib et al., 1997; Gertner et al., 2002; Gilson et al., 2001). This implies 
that break-up firms may be more diversified than comparable firms, with the break-up being a 
                                                 
7 At the completion date, which is typically between one and two weeks before the distribution date, the last details 
of the break-up are announced including the exact distribution date and distribution ratios. 
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mechanism to achieve a similar degree of diversification than non-break up firms. Gertner et al. 
(2002) and Habib et al. (1997) explain the positive stock-market reaction to break-up announce-
ments with more efficient capital allocation, which implies that the market value of assets of 
break-up firms may be comparatively low due to inefficiencies. Mansi and Reeb (2002) find that 
the conglomerate discount is a function of leverage, implying that diversified break-up firms 
should have high leverage and a lower level of priced risk. According to Harris (2003, p. 315), 
information asymmetry is lower for conglomerates as private information about individual opera-
tions may be of little help in valuing the entire entity. According to these arguments, break-up 
firms should have higher leverage, a lower level of systematic and idiosyncratic risk, and a lower 
market value of assets than comparable non-break up firms. 
Audited mandatory disclosure is more useful to investors than additional voluntarily dis-
closure about a firm’s operations (Gigler and Hemmer, 1998). This implies that break-ups are 
always more effective in increasing the amount of useful information to public investors than, for 
instance, voluntary improvements in investor communication. As some investors appear to have a 
better improved information set after the break-up (Gilson et al., 2001; Krishnaswami and Subra-
maniam, 1999), it is likely that investors of break-up firms face a comparatively high level of in-
formation asymmetry prior the break-up. In addition, high levels of information asymmetry could 
be related to asset characteristics, such as a high level of diversification (Gertner et al., 2002), 
low analyst coverage (Bhushan, 1989a), and a high level of intangible assets (Cotter and Richard-
son, 2002; Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002). Therefore, break-up firms should be more diver-
sified and have a higher level of information asymmetry, lower analyst coverage, and more in-
tangible assets than comparable non-break up firms. 
These hypotheses are tested more formally by estimating a logit regression of a control 
sample-matched set of break-up firms on empirical measures of these characteristics. If the em-
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pirical association of the variables with the break-up probability corresponds to what other stud-
ies have been found or what is hypothesized above, one can have confidence that the sample that 
is used in this study is representative of the break-up universe and comparable to previous stud-
ies. This is considered of particular importance as the sample of break-up firms, although larger 
than what has been used in previous break-up studies, is fairly small. 
2.2 Information Asymmetry during the Break-up Process 
The second issue this paper looks at centers around the effect of the break-up process on informa-
tion asymmetry. Evidence of information leakage before the break-up announcement (Vijh, 1994) 
implies a higher level of information asymmetry before this date. A high level of uncertainty be-
tween the break-up announcement date and the completion date (Abarbanell et al., 2003; Vijh, 
1994) should be reflected in a higher level of information asymmetry during this period. Some of 
the trading activity at the distribution date has been found to be uninformed (Abarbanell et al., 
2003; Vijh, 1994) implying a low level of information asymmetry on that date. However, in-
formed investors with private information about the relative value of the new post-break up enti-
ties can exploit their knowledge only over a limited period of time while public investors are 
about to learn this information from public sources, such as prices (Bhushan, 1989a) or return 
correlations (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000), implying a higher level of information asymmetry at 
the distribution date. 
Information-related effects should be less pronounced when investors already have the 
opportunity to learn price-relevant information. This is the case when the sub already has a sepa-
rate stock exchange listing prior to the distribution. As there are significant differences in the in-
formation asymmetry across financial markets (Fishe and Robe (2004)), break-up related changes 
in information asymmetry may differ by main exchange. 
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As analyst forecasts become more precise after spin-offs (Krishnaswami and Subrama-
niam, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001), investors may then experience increases in adverse selection.8 
Therefore, whether break-ups improve the information environment of all investors or of just a 
sub-group of investors is an empirical issue, which may also depend on firm characteristics. As 
equity analysts are a source of information (Bhushan, 1989a), analyst coverage should be nega-
tively related to potential changes in information asymmetry. As focus-increasing break-ups im-
prove the information environment most (Desai and Jain, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001), information 
asymmetry should decline most for focus increasing break-ups. 
To test these hypotheses, the changes in information asymmetry over the individual 
break-up periods are looked at relative to the control period, which we define to be some time 
prior to the first public announcement of the break-up. In particular, changes in information 
asymmetry during the various stages of the break-up process relative to changes in information 
asymmetry of the respective control firm over the same time-period are regressed on empirical 
measurements of characteristics that likely influence the level of information asymmetry and 
changes therein and a dummy indicating whether a firm is a break-up firm. In addition, the sam-
ple is sub-divided according to the characteristics of the break-up. This set-up is meant to test 
whether information asymmetry significantly changes during and after the break-up and whether 
the type of the break-up and characteristics of the break-up firm are related to this change. 
2.3 Changes in the Composition of Informed Trades 
This paper argues that several types of informed traders populate financial markets. From a theo-
retical perspective, market makers are considered uninformed as they have the obligation to ac-
                                                 
8 Subrahmanyam (1991) formalises the trade-off between trading individual securities and baskets thereof whereby 
trading the basket minimises adverse selection losses and is thus more attractive to uninformed traders. In this con-
text, this implies that investors with private information about the relative value of the parent and the sub trade at 
public investors’ expense after the break-up consummation. 
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commodated order flow and are thus required to trade with potentially informed traders (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985)9. Informed traders can be insiders (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) 
or skilled information analysts (Glosten and Harris 1988; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994, 1997), for 
which this paper accounts by considering information asymmetry that is due to private informa-
tion and one that is due to skilled analysis of public data. 
While it seems that the information set of financial analysts improves after the break-up 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), it is not clear whether this also applies to all investors. 
Although financial analysts seem to use public information (Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman, 
1998), there appears to be some evidence that analysts possess the ability to create private infor-
mation from the analysis of public data as Gilson et al. (2001) find differences in the quality of 
forecasts across individual analysts. The information of analysts seems to be price-relevant 
(Bhushan, 1989b; Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993) and, as the results of Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1995) imply, it appears to be exploited by informed traders if it is not made 
public by financial analysts themselves. Since Easley et al. (1998) find that higher analyst follow-
ing is also associated with more informed trading, it could be that analysts generate private in-
formation from public information that is subsequently used by informed traders.10 Therefore, 
those informed investors who exploit information generated from skilled information analysis are 
hypothesized to benefit from the break-up and are hence expected to increase their adverse selec-
tion profits following the break-up. 
                                                 
9 This assertion also seems to be empirically validated as Sadka and Scherbina (2006) find that periods of high in-
formation uncertainty coincide with low liquidity. This implies that voluntary market makers, such as those who 
submit limit orders, quit the market when uncertainty is high, supposedly to avoid trading with informed traders, 
showing that liquidity providers are generally uninformed. An exemption is the informed value trader, who accom-
modates uninformed trades that drive prices away from fundamentals (see Harris (2003)). 
10 Private information is likely to be exploited by informed traders, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that private 
information acquisition is only done as long as the marginal benefit – the returns from informed trades – equals mar-
ginal costs – the resources committed to the creation of private information. 
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We then empirically examine whether the two groups of informed traders (insiders and in-
formation analysts) are equally affected by the break-up as depending on the relative importance 
of either group of informed investors, the overall level of information asymmetry could either 
decline or increase after the break-up. As stock markets generally interpret break-up announce-
ments as positive news, investors are expected to anticipate overall reductions in information 
asymmetry. As the importance of insider trades is likely to decline and the trades by information 
analysts are likely to become more important, the announcement reaction implies that investors 
are more concerned with firm-specific information asymmetry to be reduced, while they hardly 
mind the increase in information asymmetry about systematic return components.  
To empirically test these hypotheses, information asymmetry is decomposed into compo-
nents that are related to the environment of a firm and its structural characteristics. The idiosyn-
cratic, unexplained, part is considered to be a reflection of information asymmetry associated 
with insiders. Whether, and if so, how the thereby de-composed information asymmetry changes 
over the break-up process is then tested. Finally, the individual components of information asym-
metry are related to the announcement returns in a regression framework to determine whether 
changes in information asymmetry in general, and information asymmetry associated with insider 
trades in particular, are associated with the announcement return. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Raw Data 
This study looks at spin-offs and equity carve-outs during the period January 1995 to December 
2005. These cases are identified by transactions that have CRSP distribution codes 3 or 5. ADRs 
are retained as U.S. exchanges assume an important role in the price discovery of foreign firms 
(Levine and Schmukler, 2006). The Financial Times on LexisNexis, EDGAR-filings, the New 
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York Times, Thomson Research, and the Perfect Filings database are manually checked to select 
only transactions that constitute a re-distribution of operations of a previously combined entity, to 
find information about the event dates, and to get details about the structure of the break-up. The 
structure of the break-up is referred to as break-up type. The additional requirement of sufficient 
data in TAQ, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT results in 166 transactions or 528 firm-event observa-
tions.11  
Information asymmetry is captured using three alternative measures. First, yearly PIN 
values spanning the years 1993 to 2001 are downloaded from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s homepage.12 
Second, one-year ahead earnings per share (hereafter EPS) forecast data are downloaded from 
I/B/E/S and the monthly standard deviation is calculated to create monthly values of analyst fore-
cast dispersion. The measure of information asymmetry that most of the empirical tests rely on is 
based on intra-day TAQ data and is labeled IA1. Its construction is described Section 3.2. To con-
struct this measure, BBO trade and quote data is downloaded from TAQ, cleaned,13 and signed 
using the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm. 
                                                 
11 Some firms break-up into more than two entities resulting in more than twice as many firm-event observations 
than there are break-up events. Most of the empirical break-up studies just use the CRSP distribution codes 3762 to 
3765, 5573, and 5873. This paper considers a broader sample that contains all instances with the first digit of the 
CRSP distribution code equal to either 3 (“exchanges and reorganisations”) or 5 (“splits and stock dividends”). These 
fairly general pre-selection criteria allow cases that CRSP has not classified yet or cases that are break-ups but have 
distribution codes other than the ones typically used by empirical studies. After a first manual check to delete obvi-
ous cases of stock dividends, 2,083 individual transactions are retained that are manually checked using the sources 
mentioned in the main text to ascertain that each case constitutes a break-up. This search results in 270 break-up 
cases. As one firm has two break-ups in one month, there are 269 individual monthly observations. Requiring avail-
ability of COMPUSTAT data further reduces the sample by 87 observations to 182. Merging the sample with the 
TAQ database leaves 176 cases. Ten break-up observations are lost because the pre-announcement control period is 
earlier than January 1995 or the post-distribution control period is later than December 2005, resulting in the final 
sample of 166 cases. 
12 We would like to thank Soeren Hvidkjaer for making the PIN data available on his website: 
 http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/data.htm. 
13 Trades that are at the market open, out of sequence, with special settlement conditions, outside the market opening 
times or that have been corrected are excluded as are quotes that are posted at the market open, are negative, or lead 
to a bid-ask spread that is either negative, of above five U.S. dollars. Observations are deleted where the bid-ask 
spread is larger than 40 percent of the quote mid-point. 
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Stock prices, the number of stocks outstanding, stock returns and volume data are from 
CRSP. Firm size is calculated as the daily closing stock price times the number of shares out-
standing. Annual total firm-risk is the yearly standard deviation of daily stock returns in excess of 
the risk-free rate. The one-month Treasury bill rate retrieved from the Fama-French database. 
Squared daily returns are used for daily values of stock-level volatility. Systematic risk is cap-
tured by the beta coefficient of a Scholes and Williams (1977)-type regression calculated by cal-
endar year and idiosyncratic risk is the yearly average squared residual from that regression. Tick 
size is defined as the inverse of the closing stock price. To avoid co-linearity with volume, order-
imbalance is defined as the sum of the intercept and the residual of a regression of the ratio of the 
daily dollar order imbalance to total dollar volume on dollar volume. Trading volume (unex-
pected changes in bid-ask spreads) is defined as the residual of a regression of daily dollar vol-
ume (bid-ask spread) on the market average and squared returns.  
Market-level bid-ask spread, trading volume, and order-imbalance are defined as the 
value-weighted averages of the stock-level bid-ask spreads, trading volume, and order-imbalance. 
Market volatility is measured by the new methodology VIX index from the CBOE website. Out-
sider and insider ownership data are from the blockholders data by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gomp-
ers, and Metrick (2006) and the Option Metrics database is used to create a dummy that is one if 
there are options on a firm’s stock and zero otherwise. 
Balance sheet and income statement data are taken from COMPUSTAT and are winso-
rized at the top and bottom first percentile.14 The return-on-equity, ROE, and the return-on-assets, 
                                                 
14 Operating profit is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (item 13) to total sales 
(item 12). Leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt (item 9) to the sum of long-term debt and firm size. 
Intangible assets are measures as total intangibles (item 33) to total assets (item 6). Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity less the book value of common equity (item 60) and 
balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74) divided by the book-value of assets (see Scharfstein, 1998). The book-to-
market ratio is calculated as the sum of common equity, investment tax credits (item 208), and deferred taxes less the 
total value of preferred shares (items 56, 130, and 175) divided by firm size. The ratios of research and development 
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ROA, are calculated from COMPUSTAT data by dividing net income before extraordinary items 
by the average total common equity over the same fiscal year.15 
The industry classification is based on two-digit SIC codes.16 Diversification is measured 
by unrelated entropy defined as sum of the fraction of total sales attributed to each business seg-
ment weighted by the logarithm of the reciprocal of this ratio (see Palepu, 1985). Industry sales 
growth is captured by the market value-weighted average of the year-on-year percentage increase 
in sales within the same two-digit SIC industry. Break-ups where parent and sub are in different 
industries are classified as focus increasing. Analyst coverage is based on I/B/E/S data and is de-
fined as the number of analysts making a one year-ahead earnings per share (hereafter EPS) fore-
cast for a particular stock within the respective calendar year. 
3.2 Direct Trade-based Measure of Information Asymmetry 
To make this paper comparable to previous work, several measures of information asymmetry are 
constructed. First, the popular PIN measure is used. Second, analyst forecast dispersion and the 
information asymmetry measures by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) are constructed to 
ensure their conclusions extend to the data used in this paper.17 In that case, results of this paper 
could be interpreted as extensions of and additions to Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). 
                                                                                                                                                              
(hereafter R&D) expenditure (item 46) to total sales and capital expenditures (item 128) to total sales are also calcu-
lated. 
15 Alternative measures of income, such as net income, earnings before taxes, and earnings before taxes, deprecia-
tion, and amortization, are used. Equity is alternatively captured by total stockholders’ equity. The results are qualita-
tively similar. 
16 Alternatively, one could use four-digit SIC codes to construct the 48 Fama and French (1997)-industries, as Gert-
ner et al. (2002) indicate that the conventional method of using the two-digit SIC code to match firms by industry is 
imprecise. Using this industry classification, however, would make the construction of the control sample more 
complicated as the more detailed Fama and French (1997) industry definition results in fewer firms per industry that 
satisfy the matching criteria specified in Section 4.2. 
17 These measures are Forecast Error, Forecast Dispersion, Normalised Forecast Error, Announcement Reaction, 
and Residual Volatility. The construction of these variables follows Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and 
Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999). 
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Table 4 Panel A shows that the pre-announcement and post-distribution levels of these 
four measures are consistent with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). All measures are 
lower in the year following the distribution date as compared to the year preceding the break-up 
announcement date. Reductions in information asymmetry may not be as clear-cut as suggested 
by these financial analyst-based measures, as summary statistics show a post-distribution increase 
(although significant only for the paired means) of PIN. This implies that while the information 
financial analysts have and generate is more precise after the break-up, investors may not neces-
sarily enjoy a fairer information environment in financial markets after the break-up. In addition, 
these measures are available at yearly or at most monthly frequency, which does not allow ana-
lyzing the information environment around precise event dates. As this paper intends to investi-
gate the information environment on a higher frequency basis, an additional measure of informa-
tion asymmetry is constructed. 
Most of the analysis is based on IA1, which is the spread revenue of liquidity suppliers 
lost to traders demanding liquidity: 
( )1, ,t t T t tIA D M M M= −      (1) 
where Dt is a trade direction indicator taking a value of +1 for a buy and –1 for a sell. Mt and MT 
are the quote mid-points at the time of the transaction, t, and some time, T, later. The actual 
measure is then the daily trade-sized weighted averages of intra-day IA1 values. This measure 
should be positive when liquidity suppliers transact with an informed trader and zero is there is 
no private information in trades. The daily observation frequency allows splitting the break-up 
period into several periods.18 Measures similar to IA1 have been previously used in the micro-
structure literature to capture informed trading.19  
                                                 
18 These periods are: (1) the pre-announcement control period being between 100 and 20 days before the announce-
ment, (2) the pre-announcement period starting 20 days right before the break-up announcement and going until but 
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An additional issue that needs to be taken care of is the event-study context that much of 
the empirical analysis of this paper is based on. In particular, the well-documented returns that 
accrue at the break-up announcement date and the distribution date need to be controlled for as 
IA1 data of break-up firms would otherwise not be comparable to non-break up firms. Venkatesh 
and Chiang (1986) find that liquidity providers anticipate increases in information asymmetry 
prior to scheduled information events. As most of the break-up information dates are known in 
advance, one needs to control for the level of information asymmetry that liquidity providers an-
ticipate by charging higher spreads to correctly assess how changes in information asymmetry 
affects the adverse selection loss of liquidity providers. The effective spread, defined as the dif-
ference between the transaction price and the concurrent quote mid-point is a measure of the ex 
ante expectation of information asymmetry by the liquidity supplier as she intends to recapture 
expected revenue loss by adjusting the spread accordingly (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). IA1 is 
therefore scaled by the average daily effective spread. Scaling the ex post measure of information 
asymmetry, IA1, by the ex ante expectation thereof allows removing liquidity providers’ expecta-
tions of the expected return associated with the break-up. This makes the IA1 data of break-up 
firms comparable to the IA1 data of the control firms and similarly makes IA1 measured during 
non-event periods comparable to event period IA1. 
                                                                                                                                                              
excluding the day prior to the break-up announcement, (3) the three days that straddle the break-up announcement 
date, (4) the days between the announcement and the completion date, (5) the day before and after the completion 
date, (6) the time between the completion and the distribution date, (7) the days that straddle the stock distribution 
date, and (8) the post-distribution period being between 20 to 100 trading days after the distribution date. The lower 
observational frequency of PIN and financial analyst-based variables make these measures not useful for this particu-
lar analysis. 
19 Huang and Stoll (1996) capture this loss by the difference of the quote mid-point at the time of the transaction and 
the recorded transaction price a fixed time interval later. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) use the scaled differ-
ence of the transaction price and the quote mid-point over a fixed time interval to improve the comparability of the 
adverse selection loss over unequally spaced transaction times. Naik and Yadav (2003) replace transaction prices by 
the quote mid-point and thereby address problems related to the bid-ask bounce. According to Lease, Masulis, and 
Page (1991) empirical biases can be large when using transaction prices instead of the quote mid-point. This bias is 
particularly significant during information events, which makes the use of a robust measure particularly important in 
the event study context of this paper. See also Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1999), Hasbrouck and Sofianos 
(1993), and Huson and MacKinnon (2003). 
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4 Analysis 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the data of the break-up sample (Panel A) together 
with the correlation matrices (Panels B and C). Break-up firms are comparatively large consistent 
with extant literature (see, e.g., Abarbanell et al., 2003). As break-up firms appear to have a simi-
lar book-to-market ratio as their non-break-up peers, it seems unlikely that break-ups are done by 
inefficient firms to increase operating efficiency. Cases with subsequent mergers have low book-
to-market ratios in the announcement week. As this indicates comparatively high market values 
during that period this may indicate information leakage about merger activity consistent with 
Vijh (1994). Alternatively, these results could also be due to break-up companies being concen-
trated in fast growing industries as the results by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) imply. 
Foreign firms have relatively low asset values, potentially reflecting issues around inves-
tor protection relative their U.S. peers (e.g., see La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2002). Considering the comparatively large size of break-up firms, their analyst follow-
ing appears to be rather low, given that analyst following tends to increase in firm size (Bhushan, 
1989b). Increasing analyst coverage could therefore be another motivation for break-up activity, 
indicating the likely importance of investors’ information set in this context. 
The returns around the break-up announcement and the distribution date show that clean 
spin-offs earn the highest announcement return. In addition, spin-offs involving legal settlements 
and concentrated ownership stakes (i.e., cases with prior private placements), show fairly large 
negative returns at the announcement date and large positive returns at the distribution date. This 
likely reflects the uncertainty around pending legal cases that lead to negative announcement re-
turns and positive returns once all uncertainty is resolved at break-up consummation. The large 
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return for break-ups involving private placements could indicate that markets suspect large share-
holders exploiting their preferential access to top management as in the model by Maug (2002). 
Consistent with the information asymmetry-based perspective, uninformed investors may dislike 
dominant investors having preferential access to information, which enables insider trades as de-
scribed by Lakonishok and Lee (2001). Finally, Panel A of Table 2 shows that focus increasing 
break-ups have higher announcement returns than non-focus increasing ones consistent with pre-
vious studies (see, e.g., Desai and Jain, 1999). In sum, the data exhibits behavior consistent with 
earlier studies. In addition, not only the break-up itself but also its structure seems to be important 
to investors. The data therefore allow looking at cross-sectional characteristics that are hardly dis-
cussed in the extant literature and thereby improving the understanding of the effect of break-ups 
on the information environment. The following section continues the analysis in a multivariate 
setting. 
4.2 Construction of the Control Sample 
To investigate firm-level changes in information asymmetry in a multivariate setting and in the 
event-study framework that this study employs, a set of control firms needs to be selected, which 
– due to the research focus of this paper – could be matched with the break-up firms by the pre-
announcement level of information asymmetry. For comparability reasons with previous studies, 
matching is alternatively done by firm size. For each break-up firm, one control firm is selected 
that is closest in the level of information asymmetry (or firm size), has the same primary market, 
is in the same two-digit SIC industry, and that is in the same information asymmetry and firm 
size decile group during the first month of the control period than the break-up firm. Every con-
trol firm is used only once. Decile groups of monthly average information asymmetry and firm 
size are calculated across all firms that trade in the same primary market and have sufficient data 
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in both control periods, during the break-up periods, and in all the data sets specified in Section 
3.1. Summary statistics of the control samples and the break-up firms are presented in Panel D of 
Table 2, showing that the control samples match the break-up sample fairly closely. 
4.3 Main Characteristics of Break-up Firms 
As suggested by the results in Section 2.1, break-up firms are likely to be riskier, are likely to be 
less efficient, are typically more diversified, have a lower analyst coverage, have more intangible 
assets, and are likely to expose their investors to a higher level of information asymmetry (see 
Panel D of Table 2). In addition, previous studies find that break-up firms tend to be larger (Desai 
and Jain, 1999), less profitable (Gertner et al., 2002), and seem to be operating in high-growth 
industries (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). To control 
for potential interaction between these factors, a multivariate logistic regression is estimated 
where the occurrence of a break-up (setting dummy variable BUi equal to one) is related to a set 
of explanatory variables measured in the pre-announcement control period: 
( ) 1 2 3 4
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8 9 10 11
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,
i i i i i
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i i i i i
BU Size BTM Profit UnrEntropy
IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta
IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles
β β β β
β β β
β β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
  (2) 
where Sizei, BTMi, Profiti, and UnrEntropyi denote the firm size, the book-to-market ratio, the 
operating profit margin, and the diversification of firm i, respectively. IndustryGrowthi measures 
the sales growth of the industry of firm i. TotalRiski, Betai, IdioRiski, and Leveragei are the annual 
total firm risk, the systematic risk, the idiosyncratic risk, and the financial leverage of firm i. Ana-
lysti is the logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the stock of firm i, and Intan-
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giblesi measures the level of intangibles assets of firm i. Four alternative specifications of regres-
sion (2) are estimated whereby BTM is replaced by Tobin’s Q and Size is replaced by IA1.20 
Results in Panel E of Table 2 show that large, diversified firms, and firms that have a rela-
tively low market value of assets are more likely to break-up. Controlling for these effects, one 
does not find that break-up firms are much different with respect to their risk attributes, which is 
consistent with Daley et al. (1997), or have a higher level of intangible assets. The break-up deci-
sion could therefore be related to the market value of assets and the level of diversification. 
The results further suggest that break-up firms have a lower analyst coverage, which re-
flects the argument by Gilson et al. (2001) that break-ups may intend to increase their analyst 
coverage. Higher analyst coverage could also be a way to reduce the level of information asym-
metry investors are exposed to as analysts help spreading price-relevant information amongst in-
vestors. In fact, break-up firms appear to have a higher level of information asymmetry as meas-
ured by analyst forecast dispersion (see Table 3). The trade-based measures PIN and IA1 do not 
confirm this finding, however. This implies that the information asymmetry financial analysts 
face is likely to be different from the information asymmetry faced by the public investor and 
therefore makes this analysis an important contribution to the understanding of how break-ups 
affect the information environment faced by all market participants. The lower level of analyst 
coverage of break-up firms could be responsible for the higher level of analyst forecast dispersion 
of break-up firms (see Table 3). As analysts issue more precise forecasts (see Panel A of Table 4) 
and increase their coverage after the distribution date (see, e.g., Gilson et al., 2001), break-ups 
seem to be an effective way to improve the information set of financial analysts. It remains to be 
                                                 
20 The explanatory variables are normalised to a mean of zero and unit variance to be able to calculate the expected 
change in odds of observing a break-up when increasing variable j by one standard deviation by 
ˆ
jeβ , where βˆ repre-
sents the estimated regression coefficient of variable j. A stratified conditional logistic regression is used (see, e.g., 
Fleiss, Levin, and Paik, 2003) to account for the correlation structure attributable to the matched-control sample 
methodology employed here. 
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seen, whether this improvement in the information environment of financial analysts translates 
into a better information environment of all investor, which will be examined next. 
4.4 Information Asymmetry during the Break-up Process 
This section investigates how the different stages of the break-up process and firm characteristics 
interact with changes in information asymmetry. For this purpose, the difference in average in-
formation asymmetry between the control period and each break-up period of the sample firms 
and control firms is regressed on explanatory variables measured during the control period:21 
( )
( )
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4 5 , ,
i k i i i i
i i k i k
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Analyst BU BU
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γ γ ϑ η
∆ = + + + × +
× + + +    (3) 
where ∆IA1,i,k denotes the change in information asymmetry between the control period and the 
respective break-up period of firm i with primary exchange k, and the other variables are defined 
as above. To improve comparability across firms, all continuous data are demeaned. 
The results of this regression are shown in Panel B of Table 4. The coefficients of the in-
teraction of the break-up dummy and firm size are positive, which implies that smaller firms ex-
perience a larger decline in information asymmetry over the course of the break-up. As smaller 
companies tend to have a larger level of information asymmetry (Hasbrouck, 1991a,b), they have 
more scope to improve their information environment than larger firms. Most importantly, the 
level of information asymmetry, IA1, is lower after the break-up, while IA1 briefly spikes at the 
distribution date. The brief increase in information asymmetry at the distribution date shows, 
                                                 
21 Extant literature shows that stock exchanges differ in the level of information asymmetry investors are generally 
exposed to and in terms of the way new information is processed (Fishe and Robe, 2004; Stoll, 2000). Therefore, this 
regression is estimated as a random intercept model to account for the potential correlation of the IA1 observations 
within each primary market that would make OLS inappropriate (see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 322). 
Results using standard OLS and a dummy that is one if the primary exchange is the NYSE and zero otherwise are not 
materially different. The NYSE dummy loads negatively, which shows that information asymmetry changes more on 
this exchange as compared to the Nasdaq. This shows, consistent with Fishe and Robe (2004), that the NYSE is 
faster than Nasdaq in accounting for new price-relevant information that the break-up entities provide to investors. 
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consistent with the argument of Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), that uninformed investors need to 
complement their information set by searching for stocks with prices that are correlated with the 
stock price of the firm they are invested in. Until these investors have found comparable stocks to 
the post-break up entities, informed investors can exploit their private information, resulting in a 
higher level of information asymmetry at the distribution date. There is little evidence for infor-
mation leakage prior to the break-up announcement, however. Analyst coverage seems to have no 
impact on the change in information asymmetry over time. As the skill of analysts to generate 
private information from public sources is fairly heterogeneous (Gilson et al., 2001), analyst fol-
lowing may be too noisy a measure of the information environment, which further vindicates the 
microstructure approach used in this paper.22 
In sum, there seems to be little changes in the information environment during the break-
up period. However, information asymmetry declines significantly after the break-up. The post 
break-up decline in information asymmetry is consistent with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) and shows that the positive break-up effect on the information set of skilled financial in-
formation analysts also accrues to the uninformed public investor. 
4.5 Changes in the Composition of Informed Trades 
As pointed out in Section 2, two kinds of informed investors are considered: informed traders that 
happen to acquire insider information and informed traders who use publicly available data to 
                                                 
22 Results for sample sub-groups, e.g., by primary exchange or break-up type, are not shown for conciseness but are 
available from the authors on request. We find that clean spin-offs show a significant increase in information asym-
metry around the announcement date, while cases where subs have a separate listing prior to the distribution date do 
not show such an increase. This shows that private information about subs with prior listings is already impounded 
into prices at the distribution date while investors in firms that do a clean spin-off do not have a possibility to learn 
the relative values of sub and parent from market prices prior to the distribution. We also find a smaller regression 
intercept of NYSE stocks as compared to Nasdaq stocks, which shows that NYSE stocks experience a larger decline 
in information asymmetry on average (see also footnote 21). This is likely the result of the higher level of informa-
tional efficiency on the NYSE, which leaves less room for further improvements in the information environment as 
compared to the Nasdaq. 
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create private information; as pointed out earlier, these two types of informed traders may be af-
fected unequally by the break-up. This could be due, for instance, to the provision of more au-
dited financial information after the break-up, improvements in analyst coverage, and better ana-
lyst forecast precision. This section therefore investigates whether the break-up makes informed 
traders who exploit publicly available information more important relative to corporate insiders. 
To this end, information asymmetry is decomposed into three components – the market-
wide predictable component, the firm-specific predictable component, and the firm-specific un-
predictable component (see Bardong et al. (2007) for a discussion and justification of this particu-
lar set-up). This decomposition allows interpreting information asymmetry as the sum of infor-
mation asymmetry that is due to private information derived from the analysis of publicly avail-
able information (referred to as the predictable component in what follows) and information 
asymmetry that is related to insider information (referred to as the unpredictable residual compo-
nent of information asymmetry). 
The predictable component is hypothesized to increase after the break-up as there is more 
audited public information about the parent and the sub after the break-up relative to the pre-
break up period. At the same time, traders using insider information should become less advan-
taged after the break-up as more value-relevant firm-specific information is publicly available. 
Therefore, the unpredictable component of information asymmetry is expected to decline while 
the predictable component of information asymmetry should increase after the break-up. 
To investigate how beak-ups affect these two kinds of investors, IA1 is regressed on ex-
planatory variables to separate predicable from unpredictable information asymmetry.23 The re-
                                                 
23 The following regressions are estimated with a firm-specific intercept across the entire CRSP universe of stocks 
that have their main listing on the NYSE or the Nasdaq: 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 , ,i k i t t t t i tIA MBA MVOL MVLA MOIBδ δ δ δ δ ς= + + + + +    
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , , ,i k i i t i t i t i t i t i t i kIA VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOLφ φ φ φ φ φ φ υ= + + + + + + +      
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sulting unpredictable component of information asymmetry is referred to as RAIN; the predicable 
component of information asymmetry is called EXIT. 
Insider trading should co-vary little across stocks as it typically relates to private informa-
tion about firm-level idiosyncratic issues that nobody else knows as investors cannot infer this 
information from outside sources. RAIN is therefore interpreted as capturing informed trading by 
corporate insiders. By contrast, informed trading that co-varies with other information should be 
associated with informed trading that is based on exploiting public data. EXIT is therefore inter-
preted as capturing informed trading by skilled information analyst. 
The resulting association of information asymmetry with the explanatory variables (see 
Table 5) is largely consistent across size decile and is mostly similar to what is reported in Bar-
dong et al. (2007).24 More importantly, Table 6 shows that the predictable component of informa-
                                                                                                                                                              
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , , ,
i k i i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i k
IA Insider Outsider Capex
R & D BTM Profit Options Size
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ξ
= + + + +
+ + + + +    
where IA1,i,t represents information asymmetry of firm i on day t. MBA, MVOL, MVLA, and MOIB are market-level 
bid-ask spread, U.S. dollar trading volume, volatility, and order-imbalance. These variables are meant to capture 
market-wide information events that are exploited by informed traders who are able to grasp the impact of economy-
wide information on fundamental values faster and more effectively than the average investor. Stock-level trading 
characteristics are measured by the variables VLA, UEDSpread, BA, VOL, TIC, and OIB, which denote stock-level 
volatility, unexpected changes in bid-ask spreads, stock-level bid-ask spreads, trading volume, tick size, and order-
imbalance, respectively. These variables account for informed traders that exploit their superior understanding of the 
trading environment (see Madrigal (1996) for a theoretical model of these investors). Firm-level structural character-
istics, meant to account for the influence asset characteristics have on the information environment of a firm, are firm 
Size, the book-to-market-ratio (denoted by BTM), Insider and Outsider ownership, capital expenditure (denoted by 
Capex), R&D expenses, the operating Profit margin, and the availability of Options. To account for the size-effect, 
these regressions are estimated separately within size-deciles based on the daily firm size. 
Taking the predictable component of market-wide variation out of IA1 results in IA2. IA3 results if the predictable 
component related to stock-level trading characteristics is taken out of IA2. Taking the effect of firm-specific struc-
tural characteristics out of IA3 results in the unpredictable component of information asymmetry, labeled Residual 
Asymmetric Information and henceforth referred to as RAIN. The predicable component of information asymmetry, 
Explained Informed Trading, which is abbreviated by EXIT, is defined as the difference between IA1 and RAIN. 
24 Bid-ask spreads, a rough measure of transaction costs, are negatively related with the level of information asym-
metry. Trading volume, volatility, and order imbalance have a positive association, suggesting that periods of high 
uncertainty and asset revaluations put informed traders at an advantage. The negative coefficient of tick size, show-
ing that information asymmetry is lower the smaller the minimum price increment implies that the price discovery 
process of stocks with smaller minimum tick size is more efficient. Information asymmetry is lower for larger firms 
and for firms with options on their common stocks, consistent with the notion that some informed investors leave the 
stock market and enter the options market instead. Higher ownership concentration by insiders is associated with a 
higher level of information asymmetry. A lower book-to-market ratio is associated with a higher level of information 
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tion asymmetry, EXIT, increases significantly after the break-up. As total information asymmetry 
goes down (see Table 4), this implies that skilled information analysts become more important 
relative to traders that exploit insider information after the break-up. Thus, the two types of in-
formed investor are affected differently by the break-up. 
Financial analysts may be among the main beneficiaries of this type of informed trading 
as they can sell their information to would-be informed traders or exploit their private informa-
tion in the financial markets themselves. The larger resources committed by financial analysts 
after the break-up (Gilson et al., 2001) could therefore be motivated by the expected benefit that 
accrues to skilled information analysts. How public investors interpret this differential impact of 
break-ups on informed investors is discussed next, where the stock-market reaction to the break-
up announcement is looked at. 
4.6 Changes in Information Asymmetry and Announcement Returns 
This section investigates how the stock market return reaction to break-up announcements can be 
explained by post-break up changes in the information environment. Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
show in their model that exposure to information asymmetry is a priced risk factor. The positive 
market reaction to the break-up could therefore be the result of investors anticipating a decline in 
information asymmetry. This could also explain the relatively low asset valuation of break-up 
firms (see Panel A of Table 2), which could therefore also be attributed to a lack of informational 
transparency rather than a lack of operational efficiency alone. 
Cumulative abnormal break-up announcement returns of stock i are therefore regressed on 
changes in information asymmetry over the break-up period of stock i and some control variables 
using a random intercept model associated with the primary stock exchange k of stock i: 
                                                                                                                                                              
asymmetry, which, if one interprets this ratio as a proxy for growth options, is consistent with growth firms being 
more active in managing investors’ perception. 
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where CARi,k is the cumulative abnormal break-up announcement return of break-up announce-
ment i observed on primary exchange k. Daily abnormal returns are the residual from a market-
model estimated during the control period (following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). 
∆InfoAsymmetryi,j,k denotes the difference between the average level in information asymmetry 
component j (IA1, RAIN, or EXIT) during the post-distribution control period and the pre-
announcement control period of stock i trading on primary exchange k. ControlVariable repre-
sents the set of control variables Focus, Prior IPO, Clean Spin-off, Size, Beta, and Analyst, which 
are measured concurrent to the break-up announcement, and ∆ROA and ∆ROE, which are meas-
ured over the break-up period. The dummy variable Prior IPO is equal to one if the sub is sepa-
rately listed on a stock exchange prior to the break-up and zero otherwise. Clean Spin-off is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the break-up is classified as a clean, tax-free spin-off and 
zero otherwise and the other variables are defined as in equation (2).25 A significantly negative 
loading on ∆InfoAsymmetryi,j,k would indicate that the positive announcement returns are related 
to changes in information asymmetry component k. 
 The inclusion of the control variables Focus, ∆ROA, and ∆ROE specifically serves to ver-
ify whether our results are robust to alternative explanations of break-ups in general and to the 
positive stock-market reaction to break-up announcements in particular. According to the model 
by Habib et al. (1997), stock-holders of breakup firms benefit not only from an improvement in 
the information environment but also from a more efficient resource allocation. In addition, they 
show that this effect should be stronger for focus increasing break-ups as the improvement in the 
                                                 
25 As before, all continuous data are de-meaned. Adjusting the changes in information asymmetry of the break-up 
firms by the change in information asymmetry of the control firms over the same time horizon leads to the same re-
sults, which have been suppressed to save space. 
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information environment to both, investors and managers, is most pronounced in these cases. The 
variable Focus is meant to capture whether a break-up is focus increasing as it is defined as being 
equal to one if the break-up is focus-increasing and zero otherwise. ∆ROA (∆ROE) are meant to 
capture improvements in efficiency and are calculated as the difference between the return-on-
assets (return-on-equity) in the fiscal year following the break-up consummation and the return-
on-equity in the fiscal year of the break-up announcement. If break-ups improve the efficiency of 
the resource allocation of a firm and if focus increasing break-ups are more beneficial to investors 
we would expect the coefficient on these variables to be positive. Furthermore, for our results to 
be robust to these alternative explanations of break-up motivations and the stock-market reaction 
to break-up announcements, we should not see the significance of ∆InfoAsymmetryi,j,k to be af-
fected by the inclusion of these variables.26 
The results in Table 7 show that break-up announcement excess returns are related to post 
break-up decreases in information asymmetry. In addition, the announcement returns are higher 
for stocks with lower analyst coverage and break-ups that are focus increasing (though not sig-
nificantly so). A higher level of operational focus improves the quality of the information com-
municated by financial analysts to the public (Gilson et al., 2001) while a higher level of analyst 
coverage leads to more information to be communicated to the public. Both findings are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that break-ups benefit investors by lowering information asymmetry. 
Comparing the coefficients of the two information asymmetry components EXIT and 
RAIN with each other, it appears that only declines in the residual unexplained part of informa-
                                                 
26 Habib et al. (1997) also mention that managers’ compensation can be better aligned with shareholders through 
break-ups, if company stock-based compensation is used as the managers of each of the broken-off units can be 
compensated with stock of each the unit she is responsible for. This is also likely to improve the performance of the 
post break-up entities which may also be an explanation behind the break-up announcement reaction. In the interest 
of space, we do not, however, control for this hypothesis as this is likely to be a second order effect that – although 
undoubtedly important – is likely to be weaker than improvements to the information environment or to the effi-
ciency of the resource allocation of the firm. 
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tion asymmetry, RAIN, are significantly related to announcement returns. The significantly nega-
tive loading on RAIN shows that the decline in information asymmetry that is associated with in-
sider information is beneficial to all investors. The insignificant loadings on changes in the pre-
dictable component, EXIT, suggest that the gain in the information-related advantage to the 
skilled analyst does not offset the benefits to the public investor due to the overall reduction in 
information asymmetry. Thus, although break-ups appear to benefit skilled information analysts, 
it appears that also the average investors benefit from break-ups. Both groups of investors, unin-
formed and skilled investors, seem to anticipate the improvement in the information environment 
that is associated with corporate break-ups. 
While being consistent with what one would expect from extant research, our results are 
robust to the alternative motivations of break-ups and the stock-market reaction to break-up an-
nouncements. The coefficients of Focus, ∆ROA, and ∆ROE are all positive and sometimes sig-
nificant. This is consistent with the notion that stock markets value improvements in the informa-
tion environment, next to efficiency improvements, related to the break-up as Habib at al. (1997) 
theoretically show. We find that the results are robust to these alternative explanations of break-
ups and the stock-market reaction to their announcement. 
To further verify the robustness of the results, this analysis is repeated using IA1 calcu-
lated over one and two days.27 As shown in Table 8, the results are consistent with what has been 
discussed so far. Break-ups are associated with a significant decline in information asymmetry as 
the significantly negative coefficient on the break-up dummy shows. The decline in IA1 seems to 
                                                 
27 In particular, the quote mid-point right before a transaction is matched with the quote mid-point in effect exactly 
24 hours or 48 hours later. Information asymmetry models typically assume that private information is revealed once 
per trading session. Scaling IA1 calculated over more than one trading session by the effective spread would therefore 
lump together an ex ante expectations of information asymmetry referring to the day of the particular trade with in-
formation revealed to informed traders only subsequently and can therefore not be anticipated by the liquidity pro-
vider. As a result scaling IA1 by the effective spread is avoided if IA1 is calculated over more than one day to be con-
sistent with existing models on information asymmetry. 
 30
be the result of a decline in the unpredictable component of information asymmetry that is asso-
ciated with insider trading. The part of information asymmetry that is associated with trading by 
skilled information analysts, referred to as EXIT, increases after the break-up. This evidence 
shows that informed trading by corporate insiders declines while informed trading by institutions 
that create new information from public sources increases. Consistent with the results in the pre-
vious section, investors seem to attach value to correctly anticipated future declines in RAIN 
while changes in EXIT are hardly relevant. Thus, the decline in the unpredictable component, 
which is beneficial to all investors, appears to be related to break-up announcement returns. 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper utilizes direct measures of information asymmetry developed in the market micro-
structure literature to gain insights into changes in the information environment during and after a 
corporate break-up. The empirical results are consistent with extant evidence on some of the firm 
characteristics associated with break-up activity and show that information asymmetry plays an 
important role in the motivation of and the stock market reaction to break-ups. 
We find that overall information asymmetry declines after the break-up. However, in-
formed traders who derive private information from the skilled analysis of public information 
become relatively more important than informed traders who use insider information. Finally, the 
stock market reaction to break-up announcements is strongly associated with post-break up re-
ductions in the component of information asymmetry that is associated with insider information. 
The results shown in this paper strongly support the link between firm-value and informa-
tion asymmetry as suggested by Easley and O'Hara (2004). Improvements in the quality and 
quantity of the information of financial analysts resulting from the break-up (Gilson et al., 2001; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) are also reflected in improvements of public investor’s 
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information set. In addition, the significant relationship between changes in information asymme-
try and announcement returns shows that investors seem to correctly anticipate at the break-up 
announcement the post-distribution improvement in the public information set. We further find 
that investors have to wait until the break-up is completed to fully benefit from the reduction in 
information asymmetry that is associated with break-ups. 
Corporate break-ups benefit both the uninformed public investor – since the total level of 
information asymmetry is reduced – and skilled information analysts. The benefits to public in-
vestors resulting from the break-up seems to more than offset likely increases in adverse selection 
losses to skilled information analysts. These results are robust to alternative explanations of the 
break-up announcement returns. 
Our findings help explain why financial institutions commit more resources to the analy-
sis of break-up firms. Gilson et al. (2001) argue that higher analyst coverage attracts trading ac-
tivity that motivates financial intermediaries to improve their analyst coverage and therefore to 
enhance the information environment. The findings presented here also suggest that there likely 
is a second route by which benefits of break-ups accrue to financial intermediaries: either they or 
their customers exploit more profitably the analysis public information. 
Gilson et al. (2001) show that there are some information analysts that are more skilled 
than others and who get advantaged by the break-up. These analysts seem to turn their skills into 
profits by trading on the information they generate as post-break up trading activity of this type 
of trader increases. Therefore, it may not just be the expectation of attracting more retail trades 
but also the prospect of exploiting in-house analytical capabilities that makes financial institu-
tions promote break-ups among their corporate clients. Furthermore, post break-up takeovers, 
which Cusatis et al. (1993) find to be fairly common, may generate additional revenue, which is a 
further incentive to these market participants to promote break-ups among their clients and to in-
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vest resources into research capabilities that exploit the additional information that break-ups 
bring to the market. 
Our results imply that sophisticated institutional investors better exploit public informa-
tion after the break-up. Future research could therefore investigate whether this is reflected in the 
trading behavior of sophisticated investors. 
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions 
This table lists the names of the variables used in this paper in column Variable Name and the definition used to construct the 
respective variable in the column Definition. 
 
Variable Definition 
Analyst The (logarithm of one plus) the number of analysts covering a particular firm in a given year. 
Announcement date The three days that straddle the break-up announcement. 
Announcement to completion The time period between the break-up announcement and the completion date.  
BA Stock-level bid-ask spread 
Beta Stock market beta calculated using the Scholes and Williams (1977) methodology by regressing daily stock excess returns 
on the market excess returns within a calendar year. 
BTM The book-to-market ratio calculated as the sum of common equity, investment tax credits, and deferred taxes less the total 
value of preferred shares divided by firm size. 
BUi A dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i is a break-up firm and zero otherwise.  
Capex Capital expenditures to sales 
CAR The sum of daily returns in excess of the expected return derived from a market-model estimated during the pre-
announcement control period (see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)). 
Clean Spin-off This variable is one if the break-up is classified as a tax-free spin-off and zero otherwise. 
Completion date The three days that straddle the announcement of the final details of the break-up. 
Completion to the distribution The time period between the completion date and the distribution date.  
Control period Between 100 and 20 days before the break-up announcement. 
Distribution date The date of the stock distribution. 
EXIT The difference between IA1 and RAIN.  
FirmSize The logarithm of the market capitalisation of a firm. 
Focus This variable is equal to one if the break-up is focus-increasing and zero otherwise. 
Forecast Dispersion The standard deviation of one-year ahead EPS forecasts made by equity analysts in the particular month. 
IA1 The daily trade size-weighted average of the difference between the quote mid-point right before a transaction and the 
quote mid-point 30 minutes later scaled by the first quote mid-point divided by the effective spread of this transaction.  
IA2 IA1 less the variation explained by market-wide commonality variables. 
IA3 IA2 less the variation explained by firm-specific trading characteristics. 
IdioRisk The yearly average of the residuals of the Scholes and Williams (1977)-regression. 
IndustryGrowth The market value-weighted average of year-on-year relative increase in total sales in the 2-digit SIC industry of each firm. 
Insider The sum of block-ownership stakes in the common stock of a firm by corporate insiders. 
Intangibles The ratio of intangible assets to total assets of a particular firm. 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and the firm size. 
MBA Market-level bid-ask spread 
MOIB Market-level order-imbalance 
MVLA Market-level volatility 
MVOL Market-level dollar trading volume 
OIB Stock-level order-imbalance 
Options This is an indicator variable being one if there are exchange-traded options on stock i and zero otherwise. 
Outsider The sum of block-ownership stakes in the common stock of a firm by corporate outsiders. 
PIN  Yearly values are provided on Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website.  
Post-distribution The period between 20 to 100 trading days after the distribution date.  
Pre-announcement Starting 20 days prior to the announcement date up to but excluding the day prior to the announcement. 
Prior IPO This variable is equal to one if the sub had a separate stock exchange listing prior to the break-up and zero otherwise. 
Profit The ratio of profits before taxes, interest payments, depreciation, and amortisation to total sales. 
R&D R&D expenses to sales 
RAIN IA3 less the variation explained by firm-level structural characteristics. 
Returns Monthly stock returns 
∆ROA The level of return-on-asset measured in the fiscal year after the break-up consummation less the level of return-on-asset 
measured in the fiscal year of the control period. 
∆ROE The level of return-on- equity measured in the fiscal year after the break-up consummation less the level of return-on-
equity measured in the fiscal year of the control period. 
Size The logarithm of market capitalisation. 
TIC Tick size 
Tobin’s Q The sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity less the book value of common equity and deferred 
taxes divided by the book value. 
TotalRisk The yearly average of the percentage standard deviation of daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate of each indi-
vidual firm. 
UEDSpread Unexpected changes in bid-ask spreads 
UnrEntropy This variable is defined as the weighted sum of segment sales of each individual firm (see Palepu (1985)). 
VLA Stock-level volatility 
VOL Stock-level trading volume 
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics of Break-up Sample 
This table shows some summary statistics of the sample of the break-up firms around the break-up announcement and after completion (Panel A), correlation coefficients be-
tween the variables used in the empirical analysis (Panels B and C), the full sample summary statistics for the break-up firms and the control firms (Panel D) and a statistical 
test of the difference between sample and control firms (Panel E). In particular, Panel A shows the median values of some statistics of the break-up sample As of the Week of 
the Break-up Announcement and As of the Week of the Stock Distribution. The column Break-up Type shows a breakdown of the sample according to break-up characteristics. 
The columns No. Break-ups and Ind. Obs. report the number of break-ups and the number of individual firm observations across parents and subs, respectively. The variable 
definition is given in Table 1. The table also reports the relative firm size of the break-up companies as measured by their median Decile position relative to the firms in the 
CRSP Universe that have the same primary market as the beak-up firm. Return, expressed in percentages, measures the cumulative stock return in excess of the value-
weighted CRSP market average during the three days straddling the break-up announcement date or the stock distribution date. The column Relative Size shows the firm size 
of the sub as percentage of its parent. Panels B and C show the correlation coefficients between the variables used in this study. The sample comprises the break-up sample 
and the control sample that is either IA1-matched (Panel B) or Size-matched (Panel C). Frequencies are monthly, whereby the IA1-values are monthly averages and PIN is 
available on yearly frequency only. The values displayed are means of the firm-level correlation coefficients. Panel D shows full sample summary statistics of the break-up 
sample and the industry and size or IA1-matched control sample. The column Obs reports the number of observations in each sample. The columns Q1, Q3, IQ Range, and 
Median show the values of the first and the third quartile, the inter-quartile range, and the median values, respectively. The column Wilcoxon reports the p-values associated 
with a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of zero median difference between the break-up and the control sample. Billion $, %, and bp in parentheses behind the variable 
name indicate whether the unit of measurement is in billions of dollars, percentages, or basis points, respectively. Panel E shows the results of a stratified conditional logistic 
regression for matched samples of BUi, a dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i is a break-up firm and zero otherwise, on a set of explanatory variables:  
( )
( )
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5
(1) Pr BU Size BTM Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles ,
(2)Pr BU Size TobinsQ Profit UnrEntropy Indu
= β + β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
= β + β + β + β +β
( )
i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9
stryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles ,
(3) Pr BU BTM Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst
+β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
= β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β
( )
i 10 i 11 1,i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 1,i i
Intangibles IA ,
(4)Pr BU TobinsQ Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles IA ,
+ β + β + ε
= β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
 
where subscript i represents firm i. All variables are measured in the first month that begins 100 days before the break-up announcement, whereby IA1 is measured as the monthly 
average and Size as of the end of the month. All explanatory variables are standardized to a mean of zero and unit variance. P-values associated with the coefficients are reported 
in parentheses underneath the coefficients and the R-square (in percentages) is constructed using the log-likelihoods as generalized by Nagelkerke (1991). The column Non-event 
Sample shows whether the control firm selected from the control portfolio is IA1-matched (information asymmetry is therefore left out of the set of explanatory variables) or 
whether the control firm is Size-matched (and size is therefore left out of the set of explanatory variables). The column Obs. displays the number of break-up and control firm 
pairs used. The asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(continued)  
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics of Break-up Sample (continued) 
 
Panel A – General Characteristics of Break-up Sample 
Brea-up Type
Previous IPO (carve-out) 27 94 0.4 23.6 11.5 4.0 8.0 8.0 1.6 0.5 8.6 8.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 0.5 27.0
Previous private placement 6 22 0.3 27.1 13.0 3.0 9.0 7.0 -2.5 0.5 3.6 3.0 4.0 7.5 3.5 3.0 21.3
Break-up part of legal settlement 4 11 0.4 16.3 17.0 3.0 6.5 6.5 -1.5 0.6 8.7 12.0 7.5 7.0 7.0 2.5 31.2
Clean spin-off 126 385 0.4 24.1 11.0 5.0 9.0 7.0 2.8 0.5 8.3 8.0 5.0 8.0 6.0 0.8 25.5
Break-up part of merger 3 16 0.8 0.6 3.0 8.0 6.0 5.0 0.5 0.4 1.5 3.5 6.5 6.0 4.0 1.3 69.1
Foreign firm 19 47 1.2 17.8 7.5 9.0 9.0 6.0 -0.2 1.5 6.0 6.0 9.0 7.5 5.0 0.3 20.9
U.S. firm 147 481 0.4 23.0 11.5 4.0 9.0 7.0 2.2 0.5 8.5 8.0 5.0 8.0 7.0 1.2 27.0
NYSE is primary stock market 119 347 0.4 33.1 13.0 4.0 9.0 7.0 2.2 0.5 16.5 12.0 5.0 8.0 7.0 1.1 20.7
Nasdaq is primary stock market 47 181 0.6 2.2 5.0 5.0 8.0 7.0 1.8 0.5 1.2 3.0 6.0 7.0 4.5 0.7 53.3
Break-up is not focus increasing 76 233 0.4 21.6 11.0 4.0 9.0 7.0 1.3 0.5 7.0 7.5 5.0 7.0 6.5 1.2 30.9
Break-up is focus increasing 90 295 0.4 26.2 12.0 4.0 9.0 7.0 2.8 0.5 8.5 9.0 5.0 8.0 6.0 0.8 24.8
Restructuring after the break-up 2 14 0.4 37.4 5.0 4.5 8.0 3.0 7.7 0.6 5.8 3.0 7.0 6.0 3.0 6.1 81.5
Merger after the break-up 14 53 0.4 18.3 8.0 3.0 10.0 7.0 1.3 0.5 4.6 4.0 4.0 8.0 3.0 0.4 43.3
No M&A or Restructuring after break-up 150 461 0.4 23.3 11.5 4.0 9.0 7.0 2.2 0.5 8.7 8.5 5.0 8.0 7.0 0.8 24.8
Total sample 166 528 0.4 22.5 11.0 4.0 9.0 7.0 2.1 0.5 8.3 8.0 5.0 8.0 6.0 0.9 26.8
As of Week of the Break-up Announcement
Break-
No. 
Obs. BTM Size Analyst BTM Size Analyst
As of the Week of the Stock Distribution
Size Analyst BTM AnalystSize
Decile
BTM Return
Firm FirmInd.
Size
RelativeDecile
Return
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics of Break-up Sample (continued) 
 
Panel B – Break-up Firms and IA1-matched Control Firms 
 
Size
Tobin's 
Q BTM Profit
Unrelated 
Entropy
Industry 
Growth Total Risk Beta
Idiosyncratic 
Risk Leverage Analyst Intangibles Returns
Forecast 
Dispersion PIN
Tobin's Q 0.61
BTM -0.52 -0.76
Profit 0.26 0.16 -0.16
Unrelated entropy -0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.03
Industry growth 0.10 0.14 -0.13 0.09 0.01
Total risk -0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.22 0.10
Beta 0.10 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 0.05
Idiosyncratic risk -0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.19 0.13 0.95 -0.06
Leverage -0.34 -0.38 0.28 -0.20 0.02 -0.13 0.07 0.04 0.06
Analyst 0.22 0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 -0.05
Intangibles 0.05 -0.15 0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.07
Returns 0.12 0.16 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.01
Forecast dispersion 0.01 -0.08 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.04 -0.05
PIN -0.20 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.20 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 -0.10 -0.14 0.03 -0.07
IA1 0.16 0.08 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.07  
(continued)  
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics of Break-up Sample (continued) 
 
Panel C – Break-up Firms and Size-matched Control Firms 
 
Size
Tobin's 
Q BTM Profit
Unrelated 
Entropy
Industry 
Growth Total Risk Beta
Idiosyncratic 
Risk Leverage Analyst Intangibles Returns
Forecast 
Dispersion PIN
Tobin's Q 0.60
BTM -0.52 -0.76
Profit 0.23 0.14 -0.13
Unrelated entropy -0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.01
Industry growth 0.13 0.15 -0.12 0.08 -0.02
Total risk -0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.25 0.08
Beta 0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 0.06
Idiosyncratic risk -0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.22 0.11 0.95 -0.05
Leverage -0.33 -0.38 0.27 -0.20 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.01 0.05
Analyst 0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.04
Intangibles 0.04 -0.14 0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.05
Returns 0.12 0.15 -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.02
Forecast dispersion 0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.04
PIN -0.14 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.01 -0.21 0.04 -0.19 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 0.04 -0.04
IA1 0.19 0.10 -0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.11 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.05  
(continued)  
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics of Break-up Sample (continued) 
 
Panel D – Full Sample Statistics of Break-up Firms and Control Sample 
Variable Obs Q1 Median Q3 IQ Range Obs Q1 Median Q3 IQ Range Wilcoxon Obs Q1 Median Q3 IQ Range Wilcoxon
Size (billion $) 166 0.3 2.2 7.7 7.4 166 0.3 1.8 6.2 5.9 0.55 166 0.3 2.0 6.2 5.9 0.70
Tobin's Q 166 1.1 1.5 2.2 1.2 166 1.2 1.7 2.8 1.6 0.06 166 1.2 1.7 3.1 1.9 0.03
Book-to-market 166 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 166 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.01 166 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.02
Profit (%) 166 8.0 17.0 23.2 15.2 166 7.4 15.2 23.0 15.6 0.87 166 9.0 16.2 26.1 17.1 0.52
Unrelated entropy (%) 166 0.0 26.7 66.6 66.6 166 0.0 0.0 26.2 26.2 0.00 166 0.0 0.0 36.2 36.2 0.00
Industry growth (%) 166 8.4 18.9 28.1 19.7 166 8.1 15.8 24.0 15.9 0.10 166 8.0 15.4 24.0 16.0 0.04
Total risk (%) 166 1.8 2.5 3.6 1.8 166 1.8 2.6 3.7 1.9 0.42 166 1.9 2.7 3.7 1.8 0.27
Beta 166 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.7 166 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.78 166 0.4 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.98
Idiosyncratic risk (bp) 166 2.7 5.0 10.0 7.3 166 2.5 5.9 12.9 10.4 0.44 166 3.1 6.4 11.4 8.4 0.30
Leverage (%) 166 1.6 14.4 27.8 26.2 166 0.7 9.2 27.6 26.9 0.36 166 1.0 10.0 27.6 26.6 0.30
Analyst 166 7.0 21.0 53.0 46.0 166 10.0 32.0 65.0 55.0 0.07 166 10.0 32.0 68.0 58.0 0.09
Intangibles (%) 166 0.0 4.8 13.9 13.9 166 0.0 1.8 16.0 16.0 0.35 166 0.0 2.6 14.3 14.3 0.28
IA1 (%) 166 26.9 42.5 54.2 27.3 166 26.7 43.5 52.6 25.9 0.87 166 24.6 44.0 52.0 27.4 0.85
Break-up firms Individual control firms – IA1-matched Individual control firms – Size-matched
 
 
Panel E – Differences between Break-up Firms and Comparable Non-break up Firms 
Non-event 
Sample
Speci-
fication Size 
Book-to-
Market
Tobin's 
Q Profit
Unrelated 
Entropy
Industry 
Growth Total Risk Beta
Idiosyncratic 
Risk Leverage Analyst Intangibles IA1
R-
Square Obs.
IA1-matched (1) 1.05** 6.9*** 1.10 0.49*** 0.67*** 0.31 0.11 -0.75 0.03 -0.58*** -0.01 40.4 166
(0.04) (0.01) (0.38) (0.00) (0.01) (0.58) (0.58) (0.16) (0.88) (0.01) (0.91)
(2) 0.94* 0.02 0.87 0.42*** 0.61*** 0.11 0.05 -0.53 0.24 -0.43** -0.01 29.4 166
(0.06) (0.88) (0.44) (0.00) (0.01) (0.86) (0.80) (0.46) (0.10) (0.03) (0.91)
Size-matched (3) 1.73 0.05 0.44*** 0.63*** -0.12 0.15 -0.26 -0.06 -0.35* 0.09 0.64 28.7 166
(0.14) (0.77) (0.00) (0.01) (0.81) (0.48) (0.61) (0.70) (0.09) (0.50) (0.47)
(4) 0.06 0.09 0.46*** 0.64*** -0.29 0.12 -0.15 0.10 -0.28 0.02 0.97 24.9 166
(0.66) (0.56) (0.00) (0.01) (0.59) (0.56) (0.80) (0.49) (0.17) (0.88) (0.27)  
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Table 3 – Break-up Characteristics with Alternative Measures of Information Asymmetry 
The table below shows the results of a stratified conditional logistic regression for matched samples of BUi, a dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i is a break-up firm 
and zero otherwise, on a set of explanatory variables:  
( )
( )
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5
(1) Pr BU Size BTM Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles ,
(2)Pr BU Size TobinsQ Profit UnrEntropy Indu
= β + β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
= β + β + β + β +β
( )
i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9
stryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles ,
(3) Pr BU BTM Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst
+β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
= β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β
( )
i 10 i 11 1,i i
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 1,i i
Intangibles IA ,
(4)Pr BU TobinsQ Profit UnrEntropy IndustryGrowth TotalRisk Beta IdioRisk Leverage Analyst Intangibles IA ,
+ β + β + ε
= β + β + β +β +β + β + β + β + β + β + β + ε
 
where subscript i represents firm i and the variables are as defined in Table 1. IA denotes information asymmetry captured by either PIN (Panel A) taken from Soeren 
Hvidkjaer’s website or Analyst Forecast Dispersion (Panel B), which is measured as the standard deviation of one-year ahead EPS forecasts made by equity analysts. The 
industry classification is based on two-digit SIC codes. All variables are measured in the first month that begins 100 days before the break-up announcement, whereby Firm-
Size is measured as of the end of the month. All explanatory variables are standardised to a mean of zero and unit variance. P-values associated with the coefficients are re-
ported in parentheses underneath the coefficients and the R-square (in percentages) is constructed using the log-likelihoods as generalised by Nagelkerke (1991). The column 
Non-event Sample shows whether the control firm selected from the control portfolio is IA-matched (information asymmetry is therefore left out of the set of explanatory vari-
ables) or whether the control firm is Size-matched  (and size is therefore left out of the set of explanatory variables). The column Obs. displays the number of break-up and 
control firm pairs used. The asterisks ***, **, * appended to the coefficients indicate statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10, respectively. 
 
Panel A – Information Asymmetry Measured by PIN 
 
Non-event 
Sample
Speci-
fication Size BTM
Tobin's 
Q Profit
Unrelated 
Entropy
Industry 
Growth Total Risk Beta
Idiosyncratic 
Risk Leverage Analyst Intangibles IA
R-
Square Obs.
IA-matched (1) 1.72** 0.28 0.24 0.46** 0.57* 1.43 0.17 -1.07 -0.22 -0.53* 0.27 35.5 105
(0.04) (0.30) (0.64) (0.03) (0.07) (0.14) (0.56) (0.29) (0.36) (0.05) (0.15)
(2) 1.89** -0.02 0.26 0.49** 0.56* 1.26 0.15 -0.87 -0.11 -0.52** 0.25 34.4 105
(0.02) (0.94) (0.66) (0.02) (0.07) (0.16) (0.58) (0.35) (0.62) (0.05) (0.22)
Size-matched (3) 0.40 1.38 0.59*** 0.45 1.36 0.51 -1.10 -0.48* -0.26 0.24 0.45 35.4 105
(0.12) (0.21) (0.00) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.06) (0.27) (0.22) (0.66)
(4) 0.21 1.42 0.66*** 0.40 1.21 0.38 -0.85 -0.24 -0.23 0.19 0.43 33.7 105
(0.36) (0.20) (0.00) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) (0.30) (0.26) (0.31) (0.32) (0.67)  
 (continued) 
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Table 3 – Break-up Characteristics with Alternative Measures of Information Asymmetry (continued) 
 
Panel B – Information Asymmetry Measured by Analyst Forecast Dispersion  
 
Non-event 
Sample
Speci-
fication Size BTM
Tobin's 
Q Profit
Unrelated 
Entropy
Industry 
Growth Total Risk Beta
Idiosyncratic 
Risk Leverage Analyst Intangibles IA
R-
Square Obs.
IA-matched (1) 1.04 -0.12 0.69 0.55*** 0.46** 1.33* -0.49** -0.97 -0.05 -0.31 0.25 32.0 150
(0.17) (0.47) (0.50) (0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.12) (0.78) (0.17) (0.11)
(2) 1.06 -0.23 0.45 0.42*** 0.42** 2.14*** -0.4* -1.75** -0.12 -0.44* 0.17 30.0 150
(0.27) (0.30) (0.57) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.49) (0.06) (0.28)
Size-matched (3) 0.00 0.72 0.49*** 0.43** 2.15*** -0.47* -1.7** -0.10 -0.36 0.24 0.58* 31.6 150
(0.98) (0.57) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.59) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07)
(4) -0.17 0.66 0.48*** 0.43** 2.21*** -0.47* -1.76** -0.13 -0.4* 0.23 0.58* 32.1 150
(0.43) (0.59) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.45) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07)  
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Table 4 – Break-ups and Changes in Information Asymmetry 
This table shows the change in information asymmetry as a result of the break-up. Panel A shows the Mean and Median values of the Pre-announcement Level and the Change 
in Level Post-distribution of  PIN and the information asymmetry measures proposed by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) of the parents of All cases of break-ups that 
are used in the sample or of cases that involve Clean spin-offs (all values in percentages). Pre-announcement (post-distribution) Forecast Error is calculated as the absolute 
difference between the realized earnings per share number and the mean forecast in the last month of the fiscal year prior to the announcement (after the distribution date) 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the month. Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of all forecasts in the last month of the fiscal year prior to the announce-
ment (after the distribution date). The Normalized Forecast Error is the Forecast Error scaled by the standard deviation of the de-trended quarterly earnings over the past five 
fiscal years prior to the announcement (the following two years after the distribution). Announcement Reaction is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns around quarterly earnings announcements during the five fiscal years prior to the announcement (the following two years after the distribution). Residual Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the residual of a market model fitted to daily returns in the year preceding the break-up announcement (following the distribution). Values of PIN are 
as of the year prior to the break-up announcement (following the distribution) and are taken from Soeren Hvidkjaer's website. The significance levels associated with the mean 
(median) change in information asymmetry between pre-announcement and post-distribution levels are calculated as a two-sided paired two-sample t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test) of zero mean (median) difference. Panel B shows the results of regressing changes in information asymmetry over the break-up period on set of explanatory vari-
ables across break-up and control firms: 
( ) ( )1, , 0 1 2 3 4 5 , ,i k i i i i i i k i kIA Size Analyst Size BU Analyst BU BUγ γ γ γ γ γ ϑ η∆ = + + + × + × + + +  
where ∆IA1,i,k denotes the difference in average information asymmetry during the pre-announcement control period and the respective break-up period of firm i, which has its 
stock traded on primary exchange k. For conciseness, only results calculated across the entire sample are shown. The other explanatory variables and the break-up periods are 
defined in Table 1. The continuous explanatory variables are demeaned by the cross-sectional mean calculated across the two time-periods and the control and break-up firms. 
Control firms are matched on IA1. The first column reports the break-up. The estimation uses a random intercept model associated with the primary exchange of stock i. The 
asterisks ***, **, * next to the coefficients (in percentages) denote significant levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel A – Change of Alternative Measures of Information Asymmetry 
 
Sample Statistic
Forecast 
Error
Forecast 
Dispersion
Normalised 
Forecast Error
Announcement 
Reaction
Residual 
Volatility PIN
Clean spin-offs Mean 0.72 8.51 0.05 5.27 2.29 14.18 -1.01 0.70 -0.02 -0.72* -0.45*** 2.02***
Median 0.12 3.00 0.01 4.35 1.97 12.77 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.94** -0.56*** 0.97
All cases Mean 1.14 8.33 0.06 5.29 2.49 14.13 -1.36* -0.02 -0.28 -1.67*** -0.4*** 2.03***
Median 0.14 3.00 0.00 4.75 2.23 12.59 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.66*** -0.29** 0.67
Pre-announcement Level
Forecast 
Error
Forecast 
Dispersion
Normalised 
Forecast Error
Announcement 
Reaction
Residual 
Volatility PIN
Change in Level Post-distribution
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Table 4 – Break-ups and Changes in Information Asymmetry (continued) 
 
Panel B – Change of Information Asymmetry over Break-up Period 
 
Control Sample
Change in IA1 relative to the Control 
Period R2
IA 1 -matched Pre-announcement 2.1 -0.8 0.3 3.1 -0.5 -4.0 8.0
Announcement date -2.1 -1.4 2.4 4.8 -3.3 4.0 25.7
Announcement to completion 0.8 0.3 -0.9 1.5 1.6 -2.1 33.1
Completion date -0.9 -2.1 1.8 3.5 -1.4 -0.3 94.7
Completion to distribution 0.7 -0.3 1.1 4.4 ** -1.4 -0.1 97.1
Distribution date -3.1 0.8 -1.0 1.8 0.9 6.3 10.3
Post-distribution 0.5 -0.3 0.0 3.3 * -0.5 -4.9 * 7.1
Size-matched Pre-announcement 1.6 0.9 0.1 1.9 -1.0 -3.0 17.2
Announcement date 1.6 0.9 0.1 1.9 -1.0 -3.0 17.2
Announcement to completion 0.6 0.2 -0.1 2.0 0.4 -1.7 43.5
Completion date 0.1 -1.0 -1.4 3.8 0.2 -1.1 75.6
Completion to distribution -0.7 -0.2 1.0 4.7 ** -1.8 1.4 59.6
Distribution date -4.2 -0.3 -0.2 3.7 -1.2 7.2 ** 4.4
Post-distribution 0.0 -0.9 0.4 4.5 ** -1.7 -4.3 * 9.5
Analyst * BU BUIntercept Size Analyst Size * BU
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Table 5 – Decomposition of Information Asymmetry 
The table below shows the results of regressing information asymmetry, IA1, on a set of explanatory variables estimated by firm size-decile: 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 ,
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
,
i k i t t t t i t
i k i i t i t i t i t i t i t i k
i k i i t i t i t i t i t
IA MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB
IA VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOL
IA Insider Outsider Capex R & D BTM Pro
δ δ δ δ δ ς
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ υ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
= + + + + +
= + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + , 7 , 8 , , ,i t i t i t i kfit Options Sizeϕ ϕ ξ+ + +
 
where subscripts i and t denote the individual firm on day t. The variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous explanatory variables are de-meaned across the cross-section 
(third regression), across the stock-level time-series (second regression), or simply across time (first regression). The estimated regression coefficients (in basis points) are 
shown in the first column of each size decile and the associated p-value in parentheses to the right. The R-square statistics are in percentages. 
 
Regression Variable 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High)
Market-wide Intercept 39.9 (0.06) 43.4 (0.00) 61.9 (0.00) 64.1 (0.00) 53.6 (0.00) 118.8 (0.00) 62.4 (0.00) 54.4 (0.00) 68.2 (0.00) -53.2 (1.00)
MBA -30.1 (0.00) -39.5 (0.00) -43.0 (0.00) -40.0 (0.00) -38.1 (0.00) -29.8 (0.00) -28.1 (0.00) -29.9 (0.00) -19.9 (0.00) -10.0 (0.00)
MVOL 0.1 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00)
MVLA 0.1 (0.00) 0.0 (0.49) 0.0 (0.10) 0.1 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.06) 0.0 (0.10)
MOIB 0.9 (0.07) 1.9 (0.00) 3.8 (0.00) 3.8 (0.00) 5.1 (0.00) 5.3 (0.00) 5.8 (0.00) 7.3 (0.00) 9.2 (0.00) 11.5 (0.00)
R2 5.5 4.7 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.9
Stock-level trading Intercept 32.6 (0.12) 47.9 (0.00) 65.9 (0.00) 64.0 (0.00) 53.6 (0.00) 115.4 (0.00) 62.0 (0.00) 52.0 (0.00) 63.8 (0.00) -34.3 (1.00)
VLA 0.8 (0.00) 3.9 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 4.8 (0.00) 3.9 (0.00) 7.2 (0.00) 7.9 (0.00) 11.8 (0.00) 16.3 (0.00) 29.3 (0.00)
UEDSpread -27.2 (0.00) 128.3 (0.00) 47.5 (0.03) 235.8 (0.00) 168.7 (0.00) 25.6 (0.55) -279.7 (0.00) -80.0 (0.18) -550.7 (0.00) -283.1 (0.01)
BA -0.6 (0.00) -3.9 (0.00) -5.1 (0.00) -8.1 (0.00) -8.8 (0.00) -7.2 (0.00) -7.9 (0.00) -10.9 (0.00) -14.0 (0.00) -12.6 (0.00)
VOL 2.9 (0.00) 3.4 (0.00) 3.8 (0.00) 4.1 (0.00) 4.4 (0.00) 4.9 (0.00) 5.6 (0.00) 7.0 (0.00) 8.2 (0.00) 11.5 (0.00)
TIC -1.2 (0.00) -32.3 (0.00) -41.1 (0.00) -56.6 (0.00) -71.3 (0.00) -90.6 (0.00) -121.7 (0.00) -77.3 (0.00) -50.3 (0.00) -139.6 (0.00)
OIB 0.7 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.6 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.7 (0.00) 1.0 (0.00) 0.7 (0.00) 0.0 (0.01) 3.5 (0.00)
R2 6.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.5 5.5
Firm-specific structural Intercept 24.8 (0.23) 46.9 (0.00) 65.2 (0.00) 60.6 (0.00) 50.9 (0.00) 110.5 (0.00) 63.3 (0.00) 54.2 (0.00) 64.7 (0.00) -76.8 (1.00)
Size -0.8 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.9 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00)
BTM -1.0 (0.00) -0.6 (0.01) -0.3 (0.22) 1.2 (0.00) 0.5 (0.18) 1.8 (0.00) 2.1 (0.00) 2.0 (0.00) 3.6 (0.00) 6.1 (0.00)
Insider 12.4 (0.00) 1.6 (0.61) 9.5 (0.00) 8.0 (0.00) 1.7 (0.48) 6.3 (0.01) 7.6 (0.00) 4.9 (0.08) 5.9 (0.02) 9.2 (0.00)
Capex 1.3 (0.10) 0.7 (0.49) 1.6 (0.06) 0.5 (0.61) 3.1 (0.01) -1.1 (0.36) 1.1 (0.39) -6.1 (0.00) 5.2 (0.00) -6.5 (0.00)
Outsider 10.4 (0.00) 7.2 (0.00) 11.7 (0.00) 7.1 (0.00) 4.0 (0.00) 3.2 (0.01) 3.9 (0.00) 5.8 (0.00) 10.7 (0.00) 5.1 (0.00)
R&D -5.4 (0.54) -25.3 (0.01) -31.6 (0.01) 2.7 (0.78) -6.3 (0.57) -0.4 (0.96) -10.9 (0.16) -46.9 (0.00) -32.6 (0.00) -39.9 (0.00)
Profit 1.2 (0.18) -1.8 (0.12) -1.5 (0.26) -1.6 (0.22) -6.0 (0.00) -8.9 (0.00) -9.5 (0.00) -8.2 (0.00) -7.2 (0.00) -2.1 (0.13)
Options -0.5 (0.00) -0.3 (0.01) -0.7 (0.00) 0.6 (0.00) 0.8 (0.00) 1.2 (0.00) -0.9 (0.00) -0.7 (0.00) -2.5 (0.00) 1.3 (0.00)
R2 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.6 3.9 3.6 4.0
Size Decile
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Table 6 – Change of Components of Information Asymmetry over Break-up 
Process 
The table below shows the Change in Components of Information Asymmetry of the break-up firms after the 
break-up. The changes are calculated as the Mean (Median) difference of the stock-level mean (median) of IA2, 
IA3, EXIT, or RAIN during the post-distribution control period less the mean (median) of the same information 
asymmetry component of the same stock during the control-period. ∆RAIN – ∆IA1 shows the differences in 
changes in RAIN and IA1 over the break-up period and the p-value associated with a two-sided paired two-sample 
t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) of zero mean (median) difference between the post-distribution period and 
the control period. 
 
Change in Components of Mean   Median 
Information Asymmetry Change p-value   Change p-value 
IA2 -239.4 (0.056)  -218.9 (0.064) 
IA3 -169.1 (0.147)  -290.7 (0.167) 
EXIT 88.9 (0.009)  105.1 (0.142) 
RAIN -193.7 (0.103)  -257.7 (0.096) 
∆RAIN - ∆IA1 -86.0 (0.019)   -143.6 (0.213) 
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Table 7 – Change in Information Asymmetry and the Price Reaction to Break-ups 
The table below shows the results of regressing the stock market return reaction to the break-up announcement on post-distribution changes of the different components of informa-
tion asymmetry and some control variables using a random intercept model associated with the primary exchange k of each stock: 
, 0 1 , , , ,i k i j k m m k i kmCAR InfoAsymmetry ControlVariableλ λ θ ω ζ= + ∆ + + +∑  
where CARi,k is the cumulative abnormal break-up announcement return of break-up announcement i on primary exchange k. ∆InfoAsymmetryi,j,k denotes the difference between the 
average level of information asymmetry component j during the post-distribution period and the average level during the pre-announcement control period of firm i traded on primary 
exchange k. ControlVariable represents the set of control variables Focus, Prior IPO, Clean Spin-off, Size, Beta, and Analyst measured concurrent to the break-up announcement. 
The variables ∆ROA and ∆ROE are change in return on asset and return on equity, respectively. The variables are defined in Table 1. The information asymmetry components are 
IA1, RAIN, or EXIT. The variable definition is given in Table 1. The continuous explanatory variables are de-meaned by the cross-sectional mean across the two time-periods. In the 
table below, the column Variable shows the name of the explanatory variable and the columns Specification (1) to (18) lists the alternative specifications of the above regression. The 
p-values associated with a two-sided t-test that the regression coefficient is equal to zero are reported underneath the respective coefficients in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, * 
next to the coefficients (in percentages) denote statistical significant levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
∆IA1 -14.45 ** -14.58 ** -14.43 ** -14.58 ** -10.75 * -10.47 *
∆RAIN -15.31 ** -15.66 ** -15.50 ** -15.80 ** -12.24 * -12.19 *
∆EXIT 18.15 21.35 21.24 23.04 3.11 5.00
∆ROA 10.83 11.08 12.94
∆ROE 7.97 8.24 8.87 *
Focus 0.92 1.04 0.95 0.74 0.80 1.16 0.81 0.86 1.21
Prior IPO 2.86 2.76 3.74 3.38 3.34 4.28 3.27 3.34 4.25 3.67 3.74 4.71
Clean spin-off 1.99 2.10 2.07 4.73 4.74 5.65 5.10 5.16 6.06 4.90 5.10 5.83 5.31 5.49 6.33
Size 0.02 0.07 0.23 -0.03 0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.21 -0.01 0.04 0.23 -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 -0.21 -0.18 -0.10
Beta 2.68 * 2.59 2.29 2.68 * 2.59 2.27 2.70 * 2.62 2.31 2.94 * 2.89 * 2.54 2.58 2.49 2.81 2.45 2.34 2.69
Analyst -0.98 -1.07 -1.39 * -0.84 -0.92 -1.27 -0.83 -0.91 -1.26 -0.88 -0.97 -1.32 -0.99 -1.07 -1.23 -1.00 -1.08 -1.27
Intercept 4.02 *** 3.84 *** 3.98 *** 2.51 *** 2.23 *** 2.37 *** -0.24 *** -0.41 *** -1.22 *** -1.14 *** -1.43 *** -2.19 *** -0.48 *** -0.63 *** -1.51 *** -0.80 *** -0.93 *** -1.87 ***
R2 17.7 17.0 19.6 22.1 21.3 23.8 25.0 24.2 26.5 30.1 29.2 31.4 46.3 45.9 47.1 46.4 45.8 47.0
Specification
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Table 8 – Information Environment over Long Horizons 
This table shows the results of repeating the three main test of this paper with IA1 calculated over the Horizon of 1 day 
and 2 days. IA1 is defined as the daily trade size-weighted average of the difference between the quote mid-point right 
before a transaction and the quote mid-point 1 day or 2 days later scaled by the first quote mid-point. Components of IA1 
are calculated according to regressions (4) to (6), estimated by firm size-deciles based on the daily market capitalisation. 
All continuous explanatory variables are de-meaned either across the cross-section (for firm-specific structural character-
istics), across the stock-level time-series (for stock-level trading characteristics), or simply across time (for variables 
capturing market-wide commonality). The remaining variables are defined in Table 1. The name of each Test is dis-
played in the first column. Change in post-distribution IA1 relative to the control period refers to estimating equation (3) 
using the difference in the average level of information asymmetry between the pre-announcement control period and the 
post-distribution period on the left hand side. The control samples are once IA1-matched and once Size-matched. The 
column Coeff shows the estimated regression coefficient (in basis points) and the associated p-value to its right estimated 
using a random intercept model associated with the main exchange of the respective stock. The Mean change in 
components of information asymmetry shows the mean change (multiplied by 100) of IA2, IA3, EXIT, RAIN, and the 
difference between the change in RAIN and IA1, ∆RAIN – ∆IA1, between the control and the post-distribution period in 
the column Coeff. The p-value to the right of the coefficients refers to a two-sided t-test of the value in the column Coeff 
being equal to zero. The Change in information asymmetry and the price reaction to break-ups shows the results of 
estimating equation (7) using a random intercept model associated with the main exchange of the respective stock. The 
cumulative abnormal break-up announcement excess returns are regressed on the difference between average post-
distribution IA1, RAIN or EXIT and average control period IA1, RAIN or EXIT. Additional explanatory variables are Size, 
Beta, and Analyst, which are suppressed in the table below. The pre-announcement control period is between 100 and 20 
days before the announcement date and the post-distribution period goes from day 20 after the distribution date up to 100 
days after the stock distribution.  
Test Variable Coeff p -value Coeff p -value
Change in post-distribution IA1 Intercept 9.2 (0.91) 228.3 (0.51)
relative to the control period Size 0.5 (0.90) -8.5 (0.45)
 (IA1-matched control sample) Analyst -4.6 (0.34) -3.7 (0.75)
Size * BU 7.8 (0.11) 15.2 (0.19)
Analyst * BU -3.9 (0.55) -7.5 (0.55)
BU -162.0 (0.07) -332.5 (0.16)
R2 20.8 48.4
Change in post-distribution IA1 Intercept 29.2 (0.72) 681.5 (0.27)
relative to the control period Size -1.5 (0.66) -28.1 (0.06)
 (Size-matched control sample) Analyst 0.9 (0.83) -6.6 (0.72)
Size * BU 9.4 (0.04) 43.4 (0.01)
Analyst * BU -8.9 (0.14) -6.4 (0.74)
BU -176.8 (0.04) -975.2 (0.00)
R2 20.9 48.4
Mean change in components of IA2 -0.1 (0.01) -0.2 (0.04)
information asymmetry IA3 -0.1 (0.01) -0.2 (0.02)
EXIT 0.7 (0.00) 0.7 (0.00)
RAIN -0.6 (0.00) -0.6 (0.00)
∆RAIN - ∆IA1 -0.6 (0.00) -0.6 (0.00)
Change in information asymmetry and ∆IA1 -4.4 (0.03) -1.0 (0.07)
the price reaction to break-ups R2 13.4 12.6
∆RAIN -0.3 (0.07) -1.2 (0.02)
R2 17.1 13.0
∆EXIT 0.6 (0.54) 1.4 (0.12)
R2 16.8 12.3
1 day 2 days
Horizon
 
